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In Kentucky Heating Co. v. Louisville Gas Co., 59 S. W.
lO9O, the appellant had been previously adjudged by the
appellate court to be in contempt for disobedience
injunction,
of an injunction. This case was the appeal from
Disobedience
the original injunction. It appeared that the appellant after
having been adjudged in contempt continued to disobey the
injunction. Under these facts the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that the company so disobeying will be punished
by a dismissal of its appeal on a day named unless on or
before that day it should be made to appear that it has faithfully and fairly obeyed the order to obey the injunction.
One judge dissents without assigning any reason.
BANKRUPTCY.

A corporation incorporated for the purpose of giving theatrical performances and engaged solely in such business is not
one "engaged principally in trading or mercantile
Theatrical
pursuits," and cannot be adjudged an involuntary
Companies
bankrupt under the Bankrupt Act of 1898: In re Oriental
SoCiety, 104 Fed. 975.

The same court (District Court, E. D., Pennsylvania) similarly holds that a corporation whose sole business is the
mining of coal and preparing and shipping the same to
market is likewise not included under the above designation
In re Woodside Coal Co., 105 Fed. 56.
BILLS AND NOTES.

A note was signed "R. J. Beatty, President," and above the
note, on the paper on which the note was written, appeared
the name of a corporation. Under these circumSignature,
stances the Supreme Court of Indiana holds, in
Descriptlo
Second Nat. Bank of Akron v. Midland Steel Co.,
Personc,
Parol Proof 58 N. E. 833, that the presumption that the note
Was the individual obligation of the signer was not conclusive,
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but it could be shown by parol that it was the contract of the
corporation. The authorities appear to be by no means unanimous in favor of this ruling, but the court overrules expressly
previous decisions of its own state inconsistent therewith.
In Munroe v. Weir, 58 N. E. 1013, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, speaking through Chief Justice
Lost Note, Holmes, holds that a judge has power in his discreBond of
tion to enter judgment in a suit on a note declared
Indemnity on, and now alleged to be lost, without requiring
plaintiff to file the note and to execute a bond of indemnity;
since in the view of the court a bond is not always necessary
for the reasonable protection of the defendant in such cases.
CARRIERS.

The rule that a common carrier cannot exempt itself from
liability for loss due to its own negligence appears in a someNegligence, what modified form in Gardner v. Soutlern Ry.
Reduced
CO., 37 S. E. 328. There it was claimed that
Valuation
the shipper had set the value of goods at a
particular figure and was precluded from recovering anything beyond that amount. Under the circumstances of the
present case the court holds this merely an indirect attempt
of the carrier to limit its liability for its own negligence,
and, therefore, refuses to allow the contention. Two
things must concur it holds to allow a common carrier
to make a valid agreement fixing the value of shipments in
case of loss by its negligence, to wit: first, the agreement
must be reasonable, and second, it must be based on a valuable consideration. It distinguishes on these grounds various
cases in which it appeared that the rate had been lowered in
consequence of the reduced valuation, the accompanying
stipulation being reasonable.
The ordinary rule that the relation of carrier and passenger
between a railroad company and a passenger on one of its
Termination trains is not terminated when the passenger alights
of Relation of at a station, until he has had a reasonable time
Carrier and under all the circumstances to leave the station,
Passenger is not modified by the fact that the passenger does not intend to leave the station, but has planned
to 6tiy there all night: Chicago R. I & P. Ry. Co. v. Wood,
IO4 Fed. 663. Just when the relation under such circumstances ceases the couit does not decide, except in the general
holding that a reasonable time to leave must have elapsed.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In 21 Supreme Court Reporter, 132, is reported the case of
Austin v. Tennessee, to which some notoriety has already been
given by the daily papers. A law of Tennessee
origina
Package
forbade the sale of cigarettes in the state. The
court has no difficulty in holding that such cigarettes are well
recognized as articles of commerce, but the principal question
arises upon the determination of whether the sale was in the
original package. The cigarettes were shipped in the usual
size box containing ten each, such boxes lying loosely in
baskets belonging to the carrier, and not tied together. The
defendant sold one of these boxes containing ten cigarettes
and for this was indicted and found guilty. The United States
Supreme Court, by a majority of five to four, affirms this decision, holding the sale not to have been made in the original
package. The court says that "the real question in this case
is whether the size of the package in which the importation is
actually made is to govern, or the size of the package in which
bonafide transactions are carried on between the manufacturer
and the wholesale dealers residing in different states. We hold
to the latter view." The court then goes on to point out that
in its opinion the method of shipment is with the "express
intention of evading the laws of another state," and refuses to
such transaction the protection of the original package rule.
The opinion of the court is by Mr. Justice Brown.
The dissenting judges, agreeing with Mr. Justice Brewer,
who writes the dissenting opinion, regard the rule laid down
by the majority as tending to unceitainty and making each
case turn too much on the "shifting opinions of individual
judges."
An act of the Legislature of Indiana made it unlawful to
pipe or conduct natural gas from any point within the state to
Interstate any point without it. The Supreme Court of the
Commerce, state, in Manufacturers' Gas and Oil Co. v. Indiana
Natural Gas NaturalGas and Oil Co., 58 N. E. 706, holds this
act unconstitutional as an interference with interstate commerce not justified under the exercise of the state police power.
Geer v. Connecticut, 16I U. S. 519, in which it will be remembered the Supreme Court of the United States upheld such a
state statute which prohibited the shipping of game out of the
state, is distinguished on the ground that the ownership of
wild animals, before reduction to possession, is in the public,
which has a right to refuse to allow the individual to acquire
title except burdened with such conditions as it may see fit to
annex, while in this case the ownership is primarily in the
man who owns the "superincumbent lands."
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In New York a law provided that copies of the records,
books and papers constituting part of the archives of the
Impairment of Board of Health should be presumptive evidence
contracts,
of the facts recited. In Davis v. Supreme Lodge
Evidence
Knights of Honor,58 N. E. 891, an insurance case,
these records were sought to be used as facts bearing upon
the cause of death of certain persons. The Court of Appeals
inclines to the view that such a change in the rules of evidence
is so material as to amount to an impairment of the obligation
of the contract, but avoids a decision on this point by placing
its disposition of the case upon another ground.
CONTRACTS.

In Phillips v. CornEius, 28 Southern, 871, it appeared that
the respondents had accepted the plaintiff's money, and had
Alternative agreed to convey certain property to him or repay
Obligation, the money, but they refused to do either upon
Election
being requested by the plaintiff, who then brought
a bill for specific performance of the contract to convey. A
demurrer to this was overruled by the lower court and this
decision affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the court holding that on the failure of the person who
had the right to make his election in proper time the right of
election passes to the opposite party.
In Connecticut the general rule obtains that a third person
cannot sue on a contract made for his benefit to which he is
not a party. Of course certain exceptions are
Assuming
Debts of Firm, recognized.
In Morgan v. Randolpk- Clowes Co.,
47 Atl. 658, the following case is held to fall under
Suit by
Firm Debtor the general rule and not within the exceptions: A
member of a firm died and a corporation was organized to
continue its business. This corporation made a contract with
the surviving partner and the administrator of the deceased
partner, by which it took the firm property and agreed to pay
the firm debts: Held that a creditor of the firm could not
maintain an action at law for its refusal to pay his debt.
In U. S. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ful Co., 105 Fed. 93, the
United States Circuit Court (S. D. Ohio) holds that a contract
Affecting by which a corporation agrees to take the entire proInterstate duct of a number of persons, firms and corporations
Commerce engaged in mining coal and making coke in a certain district, which is intended for "western shipment," to sell
the same at not less than a minimum price, to be fixed by
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an executive committee appointed by the producers, and to
account for and pay over to such producers the entire proceeds above a fixed sum to be retained as "compensation "the stated purpose being "to enlarge the western market "and under which shipments are made into other states, is one
affecting interstate commerce and is illegal under the anti-trust
law of i89o.

"It is," says the court, "the policy of Congress to encourage and promote individual effort. It looks to individual competition rather than to combinations for the benefits which are
to follow and flow from commerce between the states, and, in
the exercise of its constitutional power, has prohibited all
combinations which restrain trade." No doubt the policy of
the common law has always been against restraint of trade,
but it seems too great an assumption that a restraint of competition is per se and of necessity a restraint of trade.
CRIMINAL LAW.

The Penal Code of Texas declares the crime of burglary
to be committed, the other elements being present, when the
entry is by" force, threats or fraud." In St. Louis
Burglary,
Brcakingand v. State, 59 S. W. 889, it appears that the defendant had entered a store during the daytime and
Enterlng

had been shut in when the store was closed at the end of business hours. The trial court instructed the jury in such a way
as to indicate that if he entered with intent to commit larceny,
his taking advantage of the common privilege to enter
amounted to the fraud contemplated by the statute, but the
Court of Criminal Appeals holds that the entry must begained
by some force, threats or fraud-some device or stratagem
must be used. Of course the indictment in this case being
statutory, considerations as to whether the entering occurred
in the day or night did not arise, the code allowing prosecution for both species of offences.
The Code of Iowa provides that the presence of any person
other than the grandjurors during the investigation of a charge,
Grand Jury,

Presenceat
Third Party

except such persons as are required or permitted
by law to be present, shall constitute a ground for
setting aside the indictment-a provision similar

to the general rule. In State v. Wood, 84 N. W. 503, the
Supreme Court of that State holds that where a father and
daughter were both witnesses before the grand jury on the
investigation of a charge against defendant, the fact that the
daughter, who was very nervous, was accompanied during her
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examination by her father, constituted no ground for setting
aside the indictment.
DEAD BODIES.

In Enos v. Snyder, 63 Pac. 170. it appeared that a man had
provided by his will that the manner, time and place of his
RighttoBury, burial should be "according to the wishes and

Wills
directions of A." Upon his death the next of kin
claimed the right to the body as against A. The Supreme
Court of California holds that the general current of authority
denies to a man the right to dkpose of hi. own body; that
thi- extends to appointing the right to bury his body to a particular person, and that the provision in this case is therefore
void. The next of kin, it is held, have the right to bury the
body, though, it is said, in England the right to the custody
and possession of the body of decedent is in the executor or
administrator until it is properly buried.

DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.

In Foot v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 84 N. W. 342, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota holds that where the personal
Right to
representative of the deceased person is the proper
Compromise

person to sue for death, he may compromise and

settle the claim arising under the statute with the party liable,
without the consent of the next of kin, or of the probate
court, where it does not appear that the settlement was procured through fraud or misrepresentation.
ELECTRIC RAILWAYS.

That an electric railway in a city street does not impose an
additional burden upon the street, so as to make necessary the
Country Roads, obtaining of the consent of the abutting property

Additional

owner who owns the fee to the middle of the

Burden
street, or so as to entitle him to damages, appears
well settled. More doubt arises when such railway seeks to
locate upon a country highway. This question is presented
to the Court of Chancery of New Jersey in Ehret v. Camden
& T. R. Co., 47 Atl. 562, and it is decided that the same
rule should be applied as applies to city streets. Pennsj vania
R. Co. v. Montgomery Co. Pass.Ry. Co., 167 Pa. 62, is apparently contrary to this view. though the court in this case seeks
to draw distinctions, mainly, however, on the facts.
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In order tha a witness may testify as to the ide.ntity of an
object, it is not necessary that he should know at the time he
competency sees it what it is, provided he obtained the requisite
of Testimony knowledge before testifying. This rule is applied
in Cleveland T. & V.R. Co. v. Marsh. 58 N. E. 821 (Ohio), where
a witness was allowed to testify that a certain object was a
torpedo,though at the time he had seen it he knew nothing
at all about it, and only learned later by being told what
objects looking like it were. But he must first qualify by
showing that he has subsequently obtained the requisite knowledge.
In Stack v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 58 N. E. 686, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts follows Railway Co.
v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 25o, and cases holding with
Power to
Order Inspec-

it, and declares that, apart from statute, there is no

tionot Party's power in the courts to make an order for the
Chief Justice
Person
inspection of a party's person.
Holmes admits authority may be found in support of the opposite view, but claims that the power does not exit at the common law, and that it would be going too far in the way of
judicial legislation for the courts to adopt it of their own
accord. He points out that the need of the power is not so
great as might appear at first blush, since refusal to submit to
such an examination would be a proper fact for admission in
evidence to be commented on to the jury.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, though conceding that
Congress has power to require revenue stamps to be placed
Untamped on certain written instruments, and to provide punInstruments ishment for failure to comply with the law, and to
make such instrument unless stamped inadmissible as evidence
in a federal court; holds that it cannot render it inadmissible
for such cause in a :rate court; and therefore construes this
section of the Revenue Act of 1898 to apply only to federal
courts: Small v. Slocumb, 37 S. E. 481. Pennsylvania is
referred to as sustaining a contrary view: Turnpike Co. v.
ZcNamara,72 Pa. 278.
In State v. Huffman. 63 Pac. I, the Supreme Court of
Oregon holds that an instruction in a criminal case, where it is
necessary that the jury be satisfied that the defendAge of
Defendant, ant is over sixteen years old, that the state need
produce no evidence as to age, defendant being
Inspa ion
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present, and his appearance being sufficient evidence of his
age, of which age the jury are the judges, is not error. There
was nothing in the record to show that in this case the appearance of the defendant was not amply sufficient to satisfy the
jury that he was more than sixteen years old, and this fact is
relied on to some extent, though the court notes the contrary
view in Indiana, where this very fact that such "real " evidence
of personal appearance cannot be part of the record is a reason
for requiring that evidence must be adduced of age.
In Zingrebe v. Union Ry. Co. of New York City, 67 N. Y.
Supp. 554, a husband sues for injuries occasioned to his wife
Exclamations by the negligence of the defendant; and offers
evidence of a physician who had examined the
of Person
wife. It is held that it is competent for such physiUndergoing
cian to testify as to her flinching and exclamations
a nedicai
Examination when he pressed on certain portions of her body,
for the purpose of showing the extent of the injury. This
seems to allow a party to make evidence for himself, but it is
difficult to imagine how satisfactory knowledge of the extent
of the injuries could be otherwise obtained and presented to the
jury.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The married woman's act in Indiana abolishes all disabilities
of married women to make contracts, except as otherwise
Contra
provided. No statute prohibits a contract directly
Between
between husband and wife. In Dailey v. Dailey,
58 N. E. io65, the Appellate Court of that state holds that a
contract so made by a wife to sign a deed of the husband's
real estate, thereby releasing her inchoate interest therein, in
consideration of his agreement to pay her a certain sum from
the proceeds of the sale, is valid. One judge dissents without
assigning the grounds of such dissent.
INFANTS.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds, in Clark v.
StantoPe, 59 S. W. 856, that a contract for the sale of land
Contract for owned jointly by an infant and another, being illethe Sale of gal as to the infant, is void altogether, as the parts
Real Estate cannot be separated, and therefore damages cannot be recovered of either party for a breach of the contract.
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JUDGMENT.

A master had been sued for injuries occurring through the
negligence of his servant, and judgment had been rendered
Conclusive against him, the servant being a witness at the
Effect Against time and denying negligence, but the jury finding
Eiploye
against his testimony. The master then sued the
servant for the amount of the judgment. In Costa v. Yoaclim,
28 S. E. 992, the Supreme Court of Louisiana holds that the
judgment recovered in the former suit "is binding on the
employe, who was notified, who was a witness, and whose negligence was the only cause of damage which was found against
his employer, who was made to pay the amount. It devolved
upon the employe. The onus was upon him to show wherein
the judgment was in any particular erroneous." The court
further holds that the measure of damages is the amount of
the recovery against the master.
In Farmers' Transp. Co. v. Swaney, i7 S. E. 592, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia holds that a
IUenasagainst purchaser of land by parol contract, which has
Purchaser been so far executed as to vest in him the right to
under a Parol compel his vendor to execute the parol contract,
contract
has an equitable right in said land so purchased,
which a court of equity will fully protect against the lien of a
subsequent judgment creditor of his vendor.
MARRIAG9.

The code of Tennessee prohibits a marriage between the
guilty husband or wife after a divorce for adultery and his or
Validity, Con- her paramour during the life of the former wife.
lct of Laws Of course it has been held in that state, as in states
having similar statutes, that a marriage between such parties
will not be recognized where they have gone into another
state not forbidding such marriage for the purpose of evading
this provision. In Newman v. Kimbrougli, 59 S. W. io6i, the
Court of Chancery Appeals goes a step further, and refuses to
recognize such marriage, though it does not appear that the
parties have been married in another jurisdiction for the purpose of evading the law. Public policy, it is held, is as much
violated in the one case as in the other.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Where the plaintiff, a night watchman in the defendant's
mill, caught his foot where carpenters had piled planks insecurely during the day and fell; held that he could
FellowServants
not recover, since the negligence, if any, was that
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of the plaint-ff's fellow-servants: Bodwellv. Nashua Mfg. Co.,
47 Atl. 613 (New Hampshire).
In Cleveland, T & V. R. Co. v. Marsh, 58 N. E. 821 (Ohio),
a station agent whose duty it was to attend to switch lanterns
PersonAssist- employed a boy to do it for him. While so enlg Servant gaged the boy was injured. Whether that injury

arose from the negligence of the railroad's servants is a point
discuesed at length in the case, but as to the contention of the
defendant that, admitting negligence, there can be no recovery
on the ground that the boy was a fellow-servant of the employe, whose negligence caused the injury, the court holds
that he is not so barred, that he is righ'fully on the premises,
is not a servant of the corporation, since it was not in the
station agent's power to make him such, nor is he a mere volunteer assi.ting such station agent, since he does so with some
purpose or benefit to be subserved on his own behalf; that he
is therefore entitled while so assisting to protection against the
servants of the company.
MORTGAGES.

In Fields v. Mott, 84 N. W. 555, a mortgage recited that it
was given to secure the prompt payment of rent according to
the terms of a certain written lea-e. and named
Rents
the amount secured, and this amount corresponded
Secured
to the amount agreed in the lease to be paid as rent. The
tenant held over under this lease, and the question presenttd
was whether the mortgage should be held to cover rent so
accruing. The Supreme Court of North Dakota holds that it
does not secure such rents.
In Oregon a statute authorizes a married woman to convey
her property to the same extent as her husband can convey
property belonging to him. In Howell v. Folsom,
Estate
63 Pac. i i6, the Supreme Court of that state holds
by
Entireties that where a married woman held with her husband
an estate by entirety, and gave a mortgage on such estate, the
death of her husband subsequently removed his right of survivorhip and the mortgage was a valid lien on the fee.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

In Smith v. Spragins, 59 S. W. 855, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky holds that when a surety.-igned a replevin bond,
Conditional and delivered it to a deputy sheriff, on condition
that the deputy sheriff was not to return it to the
s gning
of Bond by clerk's office until it had been signed by a ceitiin
other person, and the additional signature was
Surety
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never obtained, the surety is not bound and is entitled to have
the bond canceled unless guilty of laches. The court recognizes the contrary doctrine as applying to the case of a surety
who signs a note under similar circumstances: Smithi v. Moberly, IO B. Mon. 267.
RESULTING TRUST.

Where a husband has purchased land with his wife's money
and taken title in his own name, and a resulting trust has thus
Estoppel
arisen in favor of the wife, "while the decisions
to Assert
touching the wife's rights are at variance, some
jurisdictions holding there must be bad faith on her part to
create an estoppel, and others that actual bad faith or fraudulent intent are unnecessary, yet all agree that it must appear
that credit was extended to the husband on the faith of his
apparent ownership." Otherwise the wife's rights prevail:
StandardMercantile Co. v. Ellis, 37 S. E. 593.
SALES.

In Bishop v. Minderhout, 29 Southern, ii, the plaintiffs had
sold a piano to defendants, taking notes therefor, but retaining
Loss by
their title until payment in full. Before payment
Fire
the piano was destroyed by fire without negligence
ofthe defendant. In a suit on the notes recovery was denied,
the Supreme Court of Alabama holding that the loss falls on
the plaintiff, since he held the title. "The question presented,"
says the court, "is one of conflict in the authorities," and
apparently the weight of authority is opposed to this decision;
v. 6 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law (2d d.) 455.
STATUTE OP"LIMITATIONS.
A., being a resident of West Virginia, contracted a liability
in favor of B., which B. reduced to judgment, but before the
judgment was obtained A. moved out of the state.
Absence
from
In Fisher's Ez'rs v. Hartley, 37 S. E. 578, the
State
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
holds that his absence from the state does not prevent the
running of the statute of limitations. The principle on which
the court proceeds is that the judgment merges the original
cause of action and becomes a new cause of action, which
arising while A. is without the state is not within the rule preventing the statute from running where A. removes subsequent to the accrual of the cause of action, though the cause
of action upon which that judgment is founded arose prior to
his departure.
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TAXATION.

In Ruckgaberv.Moore, Io4 Fed. 947, it is held that the War
Revenue Tax of 1898 does not apply to a bequest of certain
stocks and bonds of American corporations held
Situs of
Personal by a non-resident alien, and by her bequeathed to
Property a non-resident alien. The court refers to New York
authorities, which tax corporation stock irrespective of the
domicile of the owner, but bases its decision on the principle
that the situs of personal property is that of the owner.
TRADBS UNIONS.

In Fiske v. People, 58 N. E. 985, the Supreme Court of Illinois holds that an ordinance of Chicago requiring that a
Ordinance bidder for work on a public improvement should
for Street agree to hire only members of labor unions in the
Improvement performance thereof, and that, in all contracts
executed by the commissioner of public works on behalf of
the city, the contractor should agree to hire only members of
labor unions, is unconstitutional and void, as discriminating
between different classes of citizens and as restricting competition and increasing the cost of work.
On the other hand, a statute providing that any person who
attempted to keep any employe from joining or belonging to
Preventing any lawful labor organization, by discharge or
Employes
threats of discharge, should be guilty of a misdefrom
meanor, is held invalid by the same court on the
Joining
ground that it deprives of property without due
process of law, the term property including freedom in entering into and terminating contracts: Gillespie v. People, 58 N.
E. 1007. Apparently, then, it is the unquestioned privilege of
the individual to employ union or non-union men, but a municipality may not in its contracts intentionally discriminate
between the two.
WILLS.
The Surrogate's Court of Montgomery County (N. Y.) holds
in In re Snell, 67 N. Y. Supp. 581, that a will written on
Execution, several sheets of paper, and signed by the testator
Separate
at the physical end of the writing, is properly
Sheets
executed, though the sheets are not fastened
together until after the execution, since the statute does not
provide for the fastening together of the sheets composing a
will. Wikoff's Appeal, I5 Pa. 281, is cited as in accord.

